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Copyright Protection for
Firmware: An International View
By AMY PIERSON BATES*
Member of the Class of 1982.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer technology and the law seem to operate in spite of
each other. While the computer industry grapples with the
problems of fourth generation computers,1 the legal community is
still grappling with some "first generation" questions. Two such
basic questions are how to protect proprietary interests in com-
puter programs, and how to fit computer "firmware" 2 into the
* This Note is the recipient of the Roger J. Traynor Award for the Outstanding Stu-
dent Publication during the academic year 1980-81.
1. The evolution of computers has been loosely divided into "generations" of com-
puters. Although there is no precise delineation, the generations can be characterized as
follows: (a) first generation computers used vacuum tubes; (b) second generation computers
used transistors; (c) third generation computers used integrated circuit versions of transistor
circuits (see definition infra note 2); and (d) fourth generation computers used medium or
large-scale integration circuits extensively. A. RALSTON & C. MEEK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COM-
PUTER SCIENCE 281 (1976).
2. An analytical problem arises in discussing computer law. There are no precise, uni-
form definitions for the terms most commonly used. The following is a list of general defini-
tions, to explain the terms used in the context of this note.
Hardware, the inert "body" of the computer, consists of the physical mechanisms of the
computer, such as the central processing unit, disc drives, keyboard, video terminal, printer,
etc. Since the development of the computer in the 1940's and 1950's, hardware has been
recognized as patentable subject matter. Jacobs, Computer Technology (Hardware and
Software): Some Legal Implications for Antitrust, Copyright and Patents, 1 RUTGERS J.
COMPUTERS & L. 50, 55 (Fall 1970).
Software, the instructions making up the "Brain" and "Personality" of the computer,
includes programs, supporting documentation, flow charts, tapes, records, systems, compil-
ers, and even definitions of computer languages. A. RALSTON & C. MEEK, supra note 1, at
771.
Programs have been defined as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly
or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." Final Report of the
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 30 (July, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as CONTU Report] reprinted in 1978 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) (Extra
Edition No. 2 (Aug. 31, 1978)). Programs may be embodied in many forms, including mag-
netic tape, punched cards, and magnetic discs. Programs may also be inputted into the com-
puter from the keyboard and stored in memory.
Firmware represents a hybrid of software and hardware. The term is usually applied to
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traditional hardware/software distinction.
This note will explore these issues in light of solutions, both
implemented and proposed, put forth by the United States, the
Federal Republic of Germany,' and Japan.4 The solutions differ in
terms of the type of protection allowed and the mechanisms pro-
posed to achieve the protection. The effect of international agree-
ments will also be considered.
A. Why Is Protection Needed?
Underlying the proprietary protection debate is a motivational
argument. Granting authors and inventors a limited monopoly to
their creations is believed to encourage individual effort, resulting
in a benefit to the public welfare. 5
a small integrated circuit ("chip") which has been imprinted with a program or data, and
which is then incorporated into the computer hardware. See Ross, The Patentability of
Computer "Firmware," 59 J. PATENT OFF. Soc'Y 731, 754-56 (1977). Some examples of
firmware include: (1) ROM (acronym for read-only memory): a chip which had imbedded in
it a permanent, unalterable record of a program or data. A ROM is programmed by the
manufacturer based on specifications supplied by the designer. (2) PROM (Programmable
ROM): A ROM which can be programmed once by the user, also called a "write-once"
ROM. (3) EPROM (erasable PROM): A ROM which may be erased and reprogrammed by
the user. To be erased, the EPROM must be removed from the computer and exposed to
ultraviolet light. See id. at 761 n.161. (4) EEPROM (electrically-erasable PROM), recently
developed, may be erased and reprogrammed by the computer, without removal and expo-
sure to ultraviolet light. Although both EPROM and EEPROM may be reprogrammed, both
are considered permanent memory and classed as firmware, because the erase and
reprogram mechanism is slow and cumbersome compared to regular memory (read-write
memory). In addition, both EPROM and EEPROM are non-volatile memory (the memory
is retained, even when the power is turned off).
Integrated circuits (IC's) include a broad range of electronic devices, including ROM,
PROM, and EPROM. IC's are complex circuits, building up on silicon chips (or wafers), by
a sequence of photographic reproductions, similar to photoengraving. Layouts of the struc-
tures on each layer are produced at great expense, and are converted to a mask (a type of
photographic plate) used as a master for successive reproductions. See CONTU Report,
supra, at 200. For a detailed explanation of the IC process, see Oxman, Intellectual Prop-
erty Protection and Integrated Circuit Masks, 20 JURIMETRICS J. 405, 408-10 (1980).
3. Hereinafter referred to as West Germany.
4. These three countries were chosen because they are principal characters in the
worldwide computer market.
5. "The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by per-
sonal gain is the best way to advance the public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in "science and useful arts."
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
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The creation of software and firmware requires large invest-
ments of both time and money." Software and firmware, however,
are relatively easy and inexpensive to copy.7 Before a company
makes a large investment to create software or firmware, some as-
surance is needed that a competitor will not copy' the product and
compete at a much lower price.
The need for protecting the investment in software and
firmware is increasing due to industrial trends, including:
(1) the increasing percentage of software cost to the total cost of
a computer system (now estimated at 70% of the total cost);'
(2) the trend toward less expensive computers and more wide-
spread use, especially in small businesses and homes;9
(3) the trend toward more standardized computer programs and
fewer programs written for a single user or computer (mean-
ing that a pirated program would have a greater market now
than previously);10 and
(4) the decreasing cost, and increasing use of microcomputers
containing firmware (now a component of calculators, elec-
tronic games, some watches, microwave ovens, and
automobiles, to name a few uses)."
6. In 1977, it was estimated that the annual investment in the creation and mainte-
nance of software systems on a worldwide scale was £ 7500 million ($13 billion). Copyright
and Designs Law: Report of the Committee to Consider the Law on Copyright and Designs
Law 125 (H.M.S.O. 1977) (frequently referred to as the "Whitford Report"). "[T]he time
required for the planning and preparation of computer programs is long, often amounting to
many man-months of total effort." International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property
Organization, Model Provisions on the Protection of Computer Software (Geneva, 1978) at 3
[hereinafter cited as WIPO Report], reprinted in 11 L. & COMPUTER TECH. 2 (1978). (Pages
cited refer to pages in 11 L. & COMPUTER TECH.).
7. Concerning the cost of copying a program on magnetic tape: "The cost of copying a
reel of magnetic tape, whether it contains a Chopin etude or a computer program, is small."
CONTU Report, supra note 2, at 24. Compare this with the cost of copying a program
embodied on an integrated circuit: "According to one industry executive, reproduction of a
mask set costs $20,000 to $30,000 and takes about 30 days [in Japan]." Oxman, supra note
2, at 410, citing testimony of Rogers S. Borovoy, Vice President and General Counsel, Intel
Corporation, given in a CONTU hearing.
8. WIPO Report, supra note 6, at 3.
9. For example, one component of a computer, the central processing unit, has de-
creased in cost from millions of dollars in the 1950's to $8.95 in 1979, for the same capabili-
ties. See Maggs, Some Problems of Legal Protection of Programs for Microcomputer Con-
trol Systems, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 453. A personal computer is now being advertised for less
than $200. 244 SCIENTIFIC Ahi. 79 (Feb. 1981) (advertisement).
10. WIPO Report, supra note 6, at 4.
11. For example, in 1971 the only four-function electronic calculator on the market cost
$345. Today, many calculators with the same capability are available for around $5. Oxman,
supra note 2, at 405 n.4.
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It has also been argued that strong legal proprietary protection
would encourage disclosure of new concepts and improve trade.12
II. FORMS OF PROTECTION
Various methods of protection for software and firmware
available include unfair competition, s patent, petty patent or util-
ity model, trade secret, copyright, and other registration systems.
Product design is a non-legal method used by software and
firmware producers to protect their product.
14
A 1977 survey commissioned by the National Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) con-
cluded that legal protection for software through the grant of a
limited monopoly, such as by patent or copyright, was a matter of
monumental insignificance to the software industry.1 5 This conclu-
12. WIPO Report, supra note 6, at 4.
13. Unfair competition protection, insofar as it is equivalent to federal copyright, is
preempted under the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (Supp III 1979):
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106 . . . are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is
entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common
law or statutes of any state.
Unfair competition statutes were held to be preempted by federal patent law in Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,
376 U.S. 234 (1964). In the Sears case, the Court stated: "Just as a State cannot encroach
upon the federal patent laws directly, it cannot, under some other law, such as that forbid-
ding unfair competition, give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the
federal.patent laws." 376 U.S. at 231.
As a result, the scope of unfair competition laws offering proprietary protection against
copying has been severely limited.
14. One method of product design protection for software is disseminating the program
only in machine language, i.e., object code. This is the version of the program that can be
used directly by the computer, and which is the most difficult for people to read (consisting
of binary code). Such a code is not impossible to read but it would discourage the faint-
hearted "pirate." See A. RALSTON & C. MEEK, supra note 1, at 1304-05.
' Other methods of protection include moving the "directory" to a different position on
the magnetic disc, or modifying the "address markings" on the disc. Either of these methods
would make the disc more difficult to copy, but both devices can be overcome by the use of
a special copy program. Remarks of Mike Kane, Apple Computer Co., during panel discus-
sion "Legal Safeguards for Software Developers and Users," Sixth West Coast Computer
Faire, San Francisco, April 5, 1981.
Product design protection for firmware includes "[s]ealing the chip in expoxy cement,
removing type numbers from the chip, and enciphering the program." Maggs, supra note 9,
at 454. It is still possible, however, to dissolve the epoxy and copy the chip by photograph-
ing the patterns on each layer. See Oxman, supra note 2, at 410, 418.
15. Miller, The CONTU Protection Survey, 18 JURIMETRICS J. 354, 368 (1978). This
Article is a condensation of the survey commissioned by CONTU, performed by Harbridge
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sion, however, was based on the opinions of less than three dozen
firms, 6 and thus cannot fairly be said to represent the entire spec-
trum of software and firmware developers. Cases arising subse-
quent to the survey17 demonstrate that technological agility will
not always protect software and firmware developers from having
their products copied by competitors.
The alternatives for proprietary protection will be discussed in
relation to both software and firmware. Traditionally, computer-
related devices have been divided into hardware (the machine
parts) and software (programs).18 Firmware, a more recent devel-
opment, consists of programs that are physically fixed on a ma-
chine part, and is commonly referred to as read-only memory
(ROM).19
Fitting firmware into traditional methods of protection is diffi-
cult because it has characteristics of both hardware and software.
Like software, ROM contains a series of instructions, stored in a
memory, to be carried out by a computer; ROM is programmed in
a manner similar to other memory, and during the running of the
program, it usually makes no difference to the computer or to the
end result whether the program is stored in ROM or another type
of memory.20
As with hardware, ROM is usually intended to be permanent.
The programs become physically fixed in the computer and are
usually unalterable in the normal course of operations.21 Firmware
and hardware are equally "invisible" to the user, and both often
control the elementary functions essential to the execution of the
programs.22
House, to assess the attitudes of the computer software industry on legal protection for
services and products.
16. The survey sample consisted of 116 responses from member companies of the Asso-
ciation of Data Processing Service Organizations. However, only 30% of the sample re-
sponded to the question of preferred methods of protection. See id. at 358.
17. See Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980) and
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex.
1978), discussed in text accompanying note 144, infra.
18. See definitions, note 2, supra.
19. For a more extensive definition of firmware, see note 2, supra.
20. Ross, supra note 2, at 764.
21. The recently developed electrically erasable PROM may be an exception to this
statement. See discussion in note 2, supra.
22. Ross, supra note 2, at 764.
No. 31
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A. Patent Law
To be patentable, an invention must meet three requirements:
it must be (1) within the statutory class of patentable inventions,
2
(2) novel,24 and (3) nonobvious to one skilled in the art.25
The statutory class of patentable inventions is defined in 35
U.S.C. § 101 as "[a]ny new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof. . . ." In attempting to fit computer software and firmware
within the statutory subject matter, patent applications have ei-
ther described the invention as a new machine26 or a new process.
Patent applications for program-related inventions have not
fared well in the United States Supreme Court. In 1972 and 1978
the Court rejected patents on computer programs on the basis of
non-statutory subject matter. 8 In both cases, the Court empha-
sized that it was not ruling out the possibility that some programs
may be patentable.29
In 1981, the Supreme Court overruled the denial of a patent
for a computer-related invention in the case of Diamond v.
DiehrY° The patent examiner had rejected the patent application
on the ground that the invention was not statutory subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the invention used a computer con-
trolled by a program.3 1
23. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
26. "Machine" or "apparatus" claims were involved in the early cases of In re Johnston,
502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S.
219 (1976); In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 139 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393
(C.C.P.A. 1969); Ex Parte King, 146 U.S.P.Q. 590 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1964). For a summary
of most of these cases, see Pope & Pope, Protection of Proprietary Interests in Computer
Software, 30 ALA. L. REV. 527, 536-37 (1979).
27. "Process" claims were involved in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Mus-
grave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
28. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). For
a summary of court decisions on the patentability of programmable inventions from 1968 to
the present, see Justice Steven's dissenting opinion in Diamond v. Diehr, - U.S... 101 S.
Ct. 1048, 1060-70, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155, 170-85 (1981); Pope & Pope, supra note 26, at 536-42.
29. "It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a com-
puter. We do not so hold." Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71. "A process is not unpatent-
able simply because it contains a law of nature or a -mathematical algorithm." Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. at 590.
30. 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1981).
31. Id. at 1051-54.
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In overruling the Patent Office, the Court distinguished this
case from previous cases involving computer-related inventions.
3 2
The key to the patentability of a process claim, according to the
Court, is "transformation and reduction of an article 'to a different
state or thing.' " The result of the Diehr case is that a process
which has a physical impact on an article is not made unpatentable
solely because a computer program is involved.
This decision is a small step toward program patents, but is of
very limited practical value for most programmers. Patent protec-
tion is extended on those programs which are part of a process to
transform and reduce an article to a different state or thing. This
definition does not include the large number of programs that cal-
culate without directly affecting a physical process, such as the ma-
jority of business applications and computer games.
Firmware was held patentable in 1979 by the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals in the case of In re Bradley.3 4 The inven-
tion in this case was a firmware module (ROM) which enabled the
computer to function more efficiently.3 5
The court found that the invention was "a combination of tan-
gible hardware elements-a machine-including some hardware el-
ements which contain microprogrammed information termed
"firmware."38 But because the invention as a whole was not di-
rected to firmware, the court saw no need to decide "whether
firmware per se is statutory under 35 U.S.C. 101."
'3
7
The Patent Office appealed the decision, and the case was ar-
gued as a companion case to Diamond v. Diehr. The Chief Justice
recused himself, and the Supreme Court split four to four, af-
firming the lower court's judgment.38
32. Id. at 1056, distinguishing Gottschalk v. Benson and Parker v. Flook.
33. Id. This standard is very similar to the guidelines adopted by the patent office in
1968 and rescinded in 1969. See Examination of Patent Applications on Computer Pro-
grams, 33 Fed. Reg. 15609 (1968) and 34 Fed. Reg. 15724 (1969), reprinted in 6 COMPUTER
L. SERVICE REP. (BIGELOW) 1164, 1164-66 (1979).
34. 600 F.2d 807 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
35. "[T]he claimed invention enables system base information stored in 'scratehpad'
registers of a computer to be more easily altered. The applicants accomplish their result by
employing a 'fireware' [sic] module (hardware elements permanently programmed with a
microcode) between the scratchpad registers and the system base located in the main mem-
ory." Computer Cases Argued Before Supreme Court, 500 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA), at AA-1 (Oct. 16, 1980).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 1495, 67 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1981).
No. 31
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Because of the even split, the Bradley decision does little to
clarify the question of firmware patentability. However, an analysis
of the briefs presented indicates that the Supreme Court would
probably have reached the same result-as in the Diehr case (5-4
split), if the Chief Justice had participated.
The Patent Office argued that the firmware involved was
"nothing more than a computer program,"39 and that the issue
should be governed by the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in
Pdrker v. Flook.40 Although the Flook case involved a "process"
claim for software, and the Bradley case involved a "machine"
claim for firmware, the Patent Office argued that these differences
were inconsequential.41
Bradley argued that the Patent Office did not understand the
invention, and that it was not a "program" but a "machine" that
could "rapidly change the architecture of a computer" to perform
widely divergent tasks.42 Bradley also argued that the invention
consisted of a combination of hardware elements which must be
considered in their totality, and that no single element (e.g., the
firmware) was sought to be patented.43
In the arguments in the Bradley case, the Patent Office relied
on a broad reading of the Flook case.44 The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Diehr limited the scope of Flook without expressly overrul-
ing it. 45 It is likely that the Patent Office's broad argument would
have failed after the Diehr decision, if the full court had partici-
pated. However, because the Diehr case was decided on the narrow
issue of a process claim,46 it is possible that the Bradley case,
based on a machine claim, would have a different result.
After the statutory subject matter requirement is satisfied, a
patent is not guaranteed. The novelty and nonobviousness require-
ments are also very difficult hurdles to overcome.47 Most of the in-
39. Briefs Filed in Computer Cases Now Pending Before Supreme Court, 498 PAT.,
T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) at A-1 (Oct. 2, 1980).
40. Computer Cases Argued Before Supreme Court, supra note 35, at AA-2.
41. Id.
42. Briefs filed in Computer Cases Now Pending Before Supreme Court, supra note
39, at A-2.
43. Id.
44. See text accompanying note 40, supra.
45. Diamond v. Diehr, 101 S. Ct. at 1059 n.14, 67 L. Ed.2d at 169 n14.
46. Id.
47. For example, the computer-related patent application in Dann v. Johnston, 425
U.S. 219 (1976), failed for obviousness; the application in In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392
(C.C.P.A. 1972) failed for lack of novelty.
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vestment in computer programming is directed toward the devel-
opment and implementation of programs which do not have a high
degree of inventiveness. It has been estimated that only 1% of
computer programs have sufficient inventiveness to satisfy the re-
quirements of patent law.4s
Other factors making patents a less favorable method of pro-
tection in the United States, include: (1) a large backlog at the
Patent Office, making it likely that the software or firmware will be
obsolete by the time the patent is acquired;49 and (2) the cost of
obtaining a patent (which may discourage the small inventor).50
The European Patent Convention,51 of which West Germany
is a member, defines patentable subject matter as "any inventions
which are susceptible of industrial application, which are new and
which involve an inventive step. '5 2 In the next clause, the Conven-
tion excludes computer programs from the definition of
"invention." 53
West Germany ratified the Convention on June 21, 1976, and
by the same law amended the national patent law to conform to
the Convention.5 Prior to the effective date of the amended law,
the Federal Supreme Court rejected two patent applications for
computer programs.5 5 Thus, it appears that software and firmware
(insofar as they are characterized as analogous to a computer pro-
gram) are not patentable in West Germany.
58
48. WIPO Report, supra note 6, at 5.
49. See .Oxman, supra note 2, at 434.
50. In 1976 it was estimated that the cost of obtaining a patent could easily exceed
$1,000. Note, Petty Patents in the Federal Republic of Germany: A Solution to the Prob-
lem of Computer Software Protection?, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 888, 895 n.38. In 1981, it is not
unusual for fees and costs in a computer patent case to be from $2,500 to $5,000.
51. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, reprinted in 13 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 268 (1974) and 2H J. SINNOTT, WORLD PATENT LAW & PRACTICE at EPC-3.
52. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 51, pt. II, ch. 1, art. 52,
cl. (1).
53. Id. at cl. (2)(c).
54. 2 J. BAXTER & J. SINNOTT, WORLD PATENT LAW & PRACTICE 218, applicable to pat-
ent applications filed on or after Jan. 1, 1978. For an English translation of the patent law
(Patentgesetz) of Jan. 2, 1978, [1978] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] I 2 (W. Ger.) as amended
by the law of May 26, 1972, BGB1 I 841, (prior to amendments cited in text), see 2C J.
SINNOTT, WORLD PATENT LAW & PRACTICE, WEST GERMANY 1.
55. Ramey, Patentability of Software and Firmware, 78 PAT. & T.M. REV. 99, 118
(1980), citing Bundesgerichtshof decisions of June 22, 1976 and April 21, 1977.
56. But see Ramey, supra note 55, at 119, 121, suggesting that data processing methods
or software inventions susceptible of industrial application may still be patentable, if a com-
puter program is one component. In the face of the clear language of the convention and the
amended law, this assertion is not self-evident.
No. 3]
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In Japan, article 2 of the Patent Law defines an invention as
any "high grade creation among creations of technical idea[s]
utilizing natural rules."5 At the present, a "pure" computer pro-
gram cannot be patented, as the program is considered to be man-
made (not utilizing a law of nature).58
Examples of unpatentable claims, according to the Japanese
Patent Office, include a method for calculating by division, for
classifying data, for automatically measuring a dynamic friction co-
efficient, and for calculating optimal profits from a process.59 How-
ever, a program may be part of a patent for a method of control-
ling, processing, manufacturing, or measuring, by the use of a
computer, if the method meets the standards of novelty and
creativity.60
Examples of patentable inventions, according to the Japanese
Patent Office, include a method for controlling the process of a
computer,"1 and for automatic thickness control in a hot strip
mill.8
2
It therefore appears that computer programs, if part of an oth-
erwise patentable method, may be protected in Japan."3 However,
this will not protect the large majority of programs that are
noninventive,"' or that relate solely to calculations as in the major-
ity of business applications.6 " In addition, the Japanese Patent Of-
fice is suffering from a large backlog of applications.6 '
B. Petty Patent (Utility Model)
It has been suggested that the United States adopt a junior
patent system similar to the West Germany utility model to pro-
57. For an English translation of the patent law (Law No. 121, April 13, 1959, and
amendments through Law No. 30, April 26, 1978) see 2E J. SINNoTr, WoRLD PATENT LAW
AND PRACTICE, JAPAN 1.
58. R. RUSSELL, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS IN JAPAN 161 (3d ed. 1974).
59. Yamamoto & Conlin, Guidelines of the Japanese Patent Office for the Examina-
tion of an Invention Related to a Computer Program, 77 PAT. & T.M. REv. 195, 203-13
(1979).
60. R. RUSSELL, supra note 58, at 161.
61. For example, the firmware at issue in the Bradley case, supra note 34.
62. Yamamoto & Conlin, supra note 59, at 213-19.
63. This is similar to the United States law after Diamond v. Diehr. See notes 30-33,
supra.
64. See text accompanying note 48, supra.
65. See text accompanying notes 33-34, supra.
66. The backlog was estimated at 3-4 years in 1974. But there were some indications
that the backlog was being reduced. R. RUSSELL, supra note 58, at 9.
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tect software.67 In both the West German8 and Japanese69 utility
model systems, the degree of technical advance (inventiveness) re-
quired is less than the degree required for a patent. If the United
States adopted a system of petty patents, protection would be
available for more programs than under the present system,70 but
would still not protect a majority of programs.
In West Germany, protection under the Utility Model Law of
1961 is available for useful articles which serve their purpose by
means of a new configuration or design.7 ' Protection grants the
owner a monopoly on the design for six years from the application
date, subject to a renewal fee at the end of the third year. 2
There are five requirements which must be met in order to
achieve utility model protection:73 inventiveness (Erfindungs-
hoehe), unity of subject matter (Einheitlichkeit), concrete mani-
festation (Raumform), statutory subject matter, and registration
(in lieu of examination).
The Utility Model Law provides protection for "working tools
and implements or articles of everyday use or parts thereof." 4 The
Raumform standard requires that the invention have a tangible,
permanent shape.7 5 This requirement excludes from utility model
protection diagrams, schematics, instructions, processes, and meth-
ods.76 The Raumform requirement constitutes the main obstacle to
utility model protection for software, because software lacks con-
crete shape." Firmware, on the other hand, is the permanent em-
bodiment of a program in a tangible object (the integrated circuit
"chip"). As a result, firmware may be able to meet the Raumform
requirement, as long as it is not considered analogous to software.
In Japan, utility model protection is available for a device (not
67. See Note, supra note 50.
68. 2 J. BAXTER & J. SINNOTT, supra note 54, at 30.2.
69. Id. at 31.
70. See text accompanying notes 48-50, supra.
71. Art. 1(1) of the Utility Model Law (Gebrauchsmustergesetz) of January 2, 1968,
[1968] BGB1 I 24 (W. Ger.), as last amended by the law of June 23, 1970 [1970] BGB1 I
805; English translation in 2C J. SINNOTT, WORLD PATENT LAW & PRACTICE, WEST GERMANY
56. For a short summary of the Utility Model Law, see 2 J. BAXTER & J. SINNOTT, supra
note 54, at 30.1.
72. Id. at 31.
73. Note, supra note 50, at 890.
74. Art. 1(1), 2C J. SINNOTT, WORLD PATENT LAW & PRACTICE, WEST GERMANY 57.
75. Note, supra note 50, at 900.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 901.
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a method or process) that is capable of industrial use and relates to
the shape, structure, or assembly of an article. 8 A utility model
application must embody a "technical idea," whereas a patent ap-
plication must embody a "high level technical idea."79
The exclusion of methods or processes from utility model pro-
tection in Japan, like the Raumform requirement in West Ger-
many, precludes utility model protection for software. However,
such protection may be available for the configuration of elements
on an electronic circuit, if the circuit is capable of industrial use. 0
This would appear to open the door for protection of the layout of
patterns on firmware and other integrated circuits, if the layout
(design) embodies a technical idea.81
C. Trade Secrets
Most software producers use a trade secret approach for pro-
prietary protection, with some form of contractual restriction and
program license agreement.8 2 In spite of its wide use, this form of
protection suffers from some serious weaknesses.
Trade secret protection in the United States is governed by
state law, and therefore lacks uniformity. A widely used definition
of a trade secret is "any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him
an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do
not know or use it." 8
In general, the holder of a trade secret is protected against un-
authorized disclosure or use of the trade secret by those to whom
the secret has been confided under the terms of an agreement, and
against disclosure or use when the knowledge is gained by some
78. Utility Model Law (No. 123 of 1959 and subsequent amendments), summarized in 2
J. BAXTER & J. SINNOTT, supra note 54, at 31. See also R. RUSSELL, supra note 58, at 389.
79. R. RUSSELL, supra note 58, at 390.
80. Id. at 393.
81. See discussion of integrated circuits, supra note 2, and at text accompanying note
137, infra.
82. Nimtz, Development of the Law of Computer Software Protection, 61 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 3, 21 (1979). For example:
The customer shall not in any fashion transfer or make available to any third
party the programs or manuals. The customer agrees that the programs and
manuals contain information which is proprietary to Data Train and the customer
will not reproduce or disclose this information, in whole or in part, to any third
party.
Excerpts from the Data Train, Inc. Program License Agreement, Warranty and Terms.
83. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b, at 5 (1939).
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"improper means. '8 4 Trade secret laws do not protect against dis-
covery by fair and honest means, such as by independent inven-
tion, accidental disclosure, or "reverse engineering.
8 5
In addition to substantial risks of accidental disclosure and in-
dependent discovery, the holder of a trade secret takes the risk
that the secret will be passed on to competitors by improper
means, in a way that is difficult to discover or prove.86 Once the
secrecy is lost, protection is lost as well.
In 1974, the Supreme Court held that trade secret protection
did not conflict with the policy of the federal patent law.17 As a
result, the trade secret law was saved from preemption by federal
patent law under the Sears-Compco doctrine.88 By analogy, trade
secret protection also is not preempted by federal copyright law.89
In West Germany, the Unfair Competition Law9 protects
against the unauthorized disclosure of a business or manufacturing
secret by an employee,91 and the use or disclosure of a trade or
manufacturing secret for personal gain by improper means (gegen
die guten Sitten).9 2 The Law also prohibits unlawful use or disclo-
sure for personal gain of any designs or instructions of a technical
nature, obtained in a confidential business dealing.93
Trade secrets are not defined in the statute, but the German
Supreme Court has stated on several occasions that an industrial
or commercial secret may be any fact which is: (1) connected with
a business; (2) known only to a small number of persons; (3) as to
which its possessor has a justifiable economic interest in maintain-
84. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974).
85. Id. at 476. "Reverse engineering" refers to the process of "starting with the known
product and working backward to divine the process which aided in its development or
manufacture." Id.
86. Id. at 490.
87. Id. at 491.
88. For a discussion of preemption of state law by the federal copyright and patent
laws, see note 13, supra.
89. See note 13, supra. The Copyright Act 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (Supp. III 1979) codifies
the Sears-Compco doctrine. As long as trade secret protection is not "equivalent to" any of
the rights granted under the Copyright Act, trade secret laws are not preempted by section
301(a).
90. Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb Reichsgesetzblatt 1909, at 499. Articles
17-19 reprinted in 3 S. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS 1626-27 (1975)
and 3 A. WISE, TRADE SECRETS AND KNOW-How THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, at 4-54 through 4-
56 (1981).
91. Section 17(1), 3 S. LADAS, supra note 90, at 1627.
92. Id., Section 17(2).
93. Id., Section 18.
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ing secret; and (4) has manifested an express or recognizable intent
to keep secret.94
German trade secret protection has weaknesses similar to the
weaknesses in the United States system. There is no protection
against accidental discovery by one not in a confidential relation-
ship, nor against discovery by independent investigation or "re-
verse engineering."
In contrast, the Japanese Unfair Competition Law9 5 contains
no general clause prohibiting acts contrary to honest uses.9 The
Act enumerates specific acts which are prohibited, such as creating
confusion between plaintiff's and another's business activities and
facilities, and making false or misleading representations as to the
place of origin, quantity, composition or quality of merchandise."'
Trade secrets and know-how are not generally recognized as
industrial property in Japan.98 The Tokyo High Court has stated
that "[p]rotection of know-how can only be achieved by the efforts
of the owner to maintain it as an industrial secret and prevent dis-
closure to others."99
D. Copyright
Most of the investment in computer programming goes into
developing the expression of the idea. It has been estimated that
between five and twenty percent of investment goes towards devel-
oping new concepts, with the remainder going into writing the pro-
gram in machine code, testing, de-bugging, and documenting the
program.
100
Copyright, which protects the expression of an idea, but not
the underlying idea,10 1 is the most appropriate method of protec-
tion now available for the majority of programs. The balance of
this note will discuss the features and problems of copyright pro-
tection, as well as some proposals for registration systems similar
to copyright.
94. 3 A. WISE, supra note 90, at 4-9, citing cases.
95. Law No. 14 of 1934, as amended in 1965. See 1 A. WISE, supra note 90, at 1-76.
96. 3 S. LADAS, supra note 90, at 1703-04.
97. Id.
98. 1 A. WISE, supra note 90, at 1-39.
99. Decision of September 5, 1966, Tokyo High Ct., 17 Kakyu Minshu 769, excerpted in
English in 1 A. WISE, supra note 90, at 1-39 to 1-40.
100. Galbi, Proposal for New Legislation to Protect Computer Programming, 17 Bus.L.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 280, 282 (1970).
101. 17 U.S.C. § 102, (Supp. III 1979), discussed in text accompanying note 121, infra.
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III. COPYRIGHT APPLICABILITY: UNITED
STATES
A. The Copyright Act
When the Copyright Act was overhauled in 1976, Congress in-
serted the infamous section 117, dealing with the use of copy-
righted works in conjunction with computers:
This title does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any
greater or lesser rights with respect to the use of the work in con-
junction with automatic systems capable of storing, processing,
retrieving, or transferring information, or in conjunction with any
similar device ... than those afforded to works under the law,
whether Title 17 or the common law or statutes of a state, in ef-
fect on December 31, 1977.... 102
Section 117 was enacted to maintain the status quo with respect to
computer uses of copyrighted works.10 3 The legislative history
indicates that it was enacted because it became apparent to the
drafters that the problem required further study before a definitive
legislative solution could be offered.1 The National Commission
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) was
created, inter alia, to study the problem and make recom-
mendations.05
The legislative history states that this provision "deals only
with the exclusive rights of a copyright owner with respect to com-
puter uses" but does not apply to "the copyright-ability of com-
puter programs." ' The difficulty with this distinction is that all
computer programs, copyrighted or otherwise, are used "in con-
junction with a computer." Apparently, the copyrightability of the
program is to be determined with reference to the Copyright Act of
1976, but the permissible uses of the program are to be determined
under the law as it existed on December 31, 1977.
On December 12, 1980, the Computer Software Copyright
Act 07 was signed into law. This Act gives specific legislative recog-
102. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. III 1979).





107. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980), reprinted in 506 PAT., T.M. &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), at E-1 (Nov. 27, 1980).
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nition to the problems of software proprietary protection, and fol-
lows the final recommendations of CONTU almost exactly.108 Be-
cause of these changes, the issue of software and firmware
copyrightability must be examined within several time frames.
1. Software and Firmware: Before January 1, 1978
The Copyright Office began accepting computer programs for
registration in 1964 under its "rule of doubt."109 To be accepted,
the program had to meet three requirements:110
(1) The program had to contain sufficient authorship;11'
(2) It must have been published;112 and,
(3) The copies submitted for registration had to be in human-
readable form.
The requirement of human-readability was the result of the
White-Smith Apollo doctrine, developed in 1908.11 s In the White-
Smith v. Apollo case, a player piano roll was held not to be an
infringing "copy" of the musical composition recorded on it,
because the musical composition as embodied in the piano roll was
not a written or printed record in intelligible notation.114 This
requirement caused serious problems for firmware copy-
rightability.
115
2. Software: January 1, 1978 and After
The Copyright Act of 1976,111 effective January 1, 1978, over-
hauled the federal copyright system. The Act implies that com-
puter programs are copyrightable and the legislative history ac-
companying the Act clearly demonstrates a congressional intent to
include computer programs within copyright subject matter.
108. For the final recommendations of CONTU, see CONTU Report, supra note 2, at
29-30. The only change made by the legislature was to change the "possessor" of a computer
program to read "owner" of a computer program in the new section 117.
109. CONTU Report, supra note 2, at 38.
110. Id.
111. A program consisting of a very few obvious steps would not meet the requirements
of sufficient original authorship. Id. at 50.
112. Under the Copyright Act of 1909, publication was a prerequisite for federal statu-
tory protection. Id. at 38.
113. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
114. Id. at 17.
115. See discussion of the Data Cash case at text accompanying note 159, infra.
116. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. HI 1979) [hereinafter cited as "the Act"].
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Under the Act, copyright protection subsists "[i]n original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device.1 1 7 By allowing a work to be indirectly
perceived ("with the aid of a machine or device") the Act elimi-
nates the last remnants of the White-Smith Apollo doctrine.
"Literary works" are included in works of authorship. 1 8 The
definition of literary works includes works "expressed in words,
numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regard-
less of the nature of the material objects, such as... tapes, disks,
or cards, in which they are embodied." 1 9
The legislative history states that the definition of literary
works includes "computer data bases, and computer programs to
the extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer's
expression of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas
themselves."1 0
The distinction between an idea and the expression of an idea
is set forth in section 102(b), which states that "[iln no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is de-
scribed, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
The legislative history states that "[s]ome concern has been
expressed lest copyright in computer programs should extend pro-
tection to the methodology or processes adopted by the program-
mer, rather than merely to the 'writing' expressing his ideas."'121
Section 102(b) was intended to "make clear that the expression
adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a com-
puter program .... ""I
3. The Computer Software Copyright Act12s
The Act contains two provisions: (a) an amendment to section
117. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. 11 1979).
118. Id.
119. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. HI 1979).
120. House Report, supra note 103, at 54.
121. Id. at 57.
122. Id.
123. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980), reprinted in 506 PAT., T.M. &
COPYRIGHT J., supra note 107, at E-1 [hereinafter referred to as "the amendment"].
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101 to add the definition of a computer program,124 and (b) an
amendment to section 117 to define permissible uses of copy-
righted works in conjunction with a computer. 12
5
The explicit treatment of the scope of copyright protection in
computer programs and the legislative history of the Copyright Act
of 1976126 demonstrate that Congress intended to include software
within copyright subject matter.
4. Firmware: January 1, 1978 and After
Under the language of the Act, firmware is not distinguished
from software. The Act allows for fixation "in any tangible medium
of expression ... from which ... [the work] can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated... with the aid of a ma-
chine or device.
'127
A program in read-only memory (ROM) may be reproduced in
several ways, including the following:
(1) A PROM or EPROM128 may be programmed directly from
a ROM by a computer;
(2) The contents of a ROM may be read by a computer and
printed out in object code1 29 which may then be translated into
124. "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." Id. at E-5.
125. Section 117. Limitations on exclusive rights: Computer programs.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 106, it is not an infringement for the
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of an-
other copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) That such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it
used in no other manner, or
(2) That such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that
all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the
computer program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section
may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such
copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale or other transfer of all rights
in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the author-
ization of the copyright owner.
Id.
126. See text accompanying notes 106, 120, and 122, supra.
127. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. III 1979).
128. See definitions, supra note 2.
129. Object code is the version of a program in "machine language" or binary code. It is
difficult but not impossible to read this code directly. For a more extensive explanation, see




source code 130 (which is easier to read); and
(3) The layer of the chip may be photographed13 and an iden-
tical chip (including the identical pattern of data) may be pro-
duced. Copying by either of the first two methods would be an in-
fringement under the Act,13 2 but it is doubtful whether copying
under the third method would violate a copyright.
1 33
The Act allows copyright protection for pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works. 3 4 The design of a useful article,3 5 however, is
only copyrightable to the extent that the design "incorporates pic-
torial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified sepa-
rately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utili-
tarian aspects of the article.
' '13 6
As a result, an integrated circuit (which may include data
stored in ROM) is not subject to copyright protection as long as
the layout is considered utilitarian and not artistic. The Copyright
Office planned to hold hearings to consider the copyrightability of
integrated circuit masks 37 which are used to transfer the pattern
onto the integrated circuit; the planned hearings were abandoned
130. Source code is a program written in any of several "higher-level" programming
languages. See CONTU Report, supra note 2, at 53 n.127. Such programming languages
include Basic, Fortran, Cobol, and Pascal, among others. For a more extensive explanation,
see A. RALsTON & C. MEEK, supra note 1, at 1304-05.
131. See discussion of integrated circuits, supra note 2.
132. "The owner of a copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to . . .
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies. . . . " 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (Supp. III 1979). "Cop-
ies" are defined as "[mlaterial objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any method now
known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(Supp. II 1979).
133. The CONTU Report states that the issue of copyright protection for the topogra-
phy of integrated circuits was raised too late to be dealt with adequately. CONTU Report,
supra note 2, at 200.
134. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (Supp. III 1979).
135. "A 'useful article' is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not
merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(Supp. III 1979).
136. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. III 1979). The separate identification of the utilitarian as-
pect from the artistic aspect may be conceptual as well as physical. See Kieselstein-Cord v.
Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980) in which the artistic design of a belt
buckle was held to be copyrightable.
137. A mask is a pattern, fabricated on glass, of a layer of an integrated circuit layout.
The mask is used to "imprint" the design on the silicon wafer by a process similar to photo-
engraving. For a very thorough discussion of proprietary protection of integrated circuit
masks, see Oxman, supra note 2, in which the author concludes that copyright is the most
suitable way to protect against mask piracy, and recommends that the "useful articles" doc-
trine be relaxed to allow integrated circuits to be copyrighted. Id. at 460.
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when a bill was introduced to provide copyright protection for
these masks.1"8
The bill, H.R. 1007,139 would have amended the definition of
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works in section 101 of the Copy-
right Act by adding: "such pictorial, graphic and sculptural works
shall also include the photographic masks used to imprint patterns
on integrated circuit chips and include the imprinted patterns
themselves even though they are used in connection with the man-
ufacture of, or incorporated in a useful article."
The Copyright Office supported this bill,140 but spokesmen for
integrated circuit manufacturers were split.14 This lack of unanim-
ity among the industry representatives perplexed the members of
the subcommittee holding hearings on the bill, 42 and the bill died
a quiet death. Unless the industry shows more unified support, it is
unlikely that a similar bill will be passed in the near future.
1 43
B. Case Law
Very few cases dealing with the validity or scope of a com-
puter program copyright have reached the appellate level. Two
such cases will be discussed, but it should be noted that both arose
under the old Copyright Law. A thorough analysis of the judicial
interpretation of the new Act will have to walt for further cases to
emerge.
1. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.
1
4
In 1970, Synercom published a new manual and new input for-
138. Id. at 453.
139. 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), introduced January 18, 1979 by Congressmen Ed-
wards, McCloskey, and Mineta, id. at 453 n.281, reprinted in 1980 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN COPYRIGHT LAW (PLI Course Handbook Series, No. 115) 863.
140. Oxman, supra note 2, at 457.
141. Intel and Mostek supported the bill, but Fairchild Semiconductor and National
Semiconductor opposed it. Id. at 454.
142. Id. at 458.
143. On January 5, 1981, the Design Protection Act of 1980 was introduced in the
House of Representatives to amend the copyright law. H.R. 20, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1981.
The Act clarifies the existing law regarding copyright protection for ornamental designs em-
bodied in useful articles. However, the Act would not protect integrated circuit designs be-
cause the designs are strictly functional. Section 902 of the proposed Act states that "Pro-
tection under this chapter shall not be available for a design that is ... (d) dictated solely
by a utilitarian function of the article that embodies it ..
144. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
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mats145 for use with its STRAN program, and registered the input
formats with the Copyright Office.146
E.D.I., a competitor, introduced a competing program pack-
age, including a user's manual prepared by E.D.I. but later pub-
lished and distributed by the University Computing Co.
(U.C.C.). 1 47 The manual contained mirror images of some of
Synercom's input cards, and contained instructions that allowed
the E.D.I. customer to use the Synercom input format.
14 8
By using the Synercom input format, E.D.I. benefitted in two
ways. First, E.D.I. saved time and money by not developing a new
input format.'49 Second, and more importantly, E.D.I. could lure
Synercom customers away more easily, because the customer
would not have to make major changes in order to use E.D.I.'s less
expensive program.50
Synercom sued U.C.C. for copyright infringement of its man-
ual and input formats. The court held that the input formats were
not copyrightable, on alternative grounds.
The court found that the input formats were "expressed
ideas" and not "expressions." '151 Copyright protection is only avail-
able for expressions which are "separate and apart from" the un-
derlying ideas.152 The court held that the underlying ideas in the
input formats, the selection arrangement and sequence of data, 53
were the essence of the expression of the formats.5 The court
would allow copyright protection for input formats only to the ex-
145. "In using a program one must have a format for input so that the input of data
and the instruction to the computer are compatible with its program." Id. at 1005. "The
formats by their placement of lines, shaded art, and words tell the user what data to place
where and how to do it." Id. at 1012.
146. Id. at 1006-07.
147. University Computing Co. (U.C.C.) had provided the computers to run Synercom's
program until 1976, when Synercom and U.C.C. ended their association. At that time,
U.C.C. teamed up with E.D.L, a competitor of Synercom, to offer a competing program
package. U.C.C. produced a user's manual as part of the E.D.I. package. Id. at 1009.
148. Id.
149. By the time E.D.I. entered the market, Synercom had spent approximately
$100,000 to develop the STRAN program which included the customer formats (id. at 1007)
and upwards of $500,000 to train customers in the use of the formats. Id. at 1008.
150. By simply changing to U.C.C.'s control cards, a user could switch from Synercom's
programs to E.D.I.'s programs with no change to the customer's data formats. Id. at 1009.
E.D.I. could thereby undersell Synercom because it did not incur the development or train-
ing costs. Id. at 1008.
151. Id. at 1013-14.
152. Id. at 1014.
153. Id. at 1012.
154. Id. at 1014.
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tent that expressions involve stylistic creativity above and beyond
the bare expression of sequence and arrangement.' 55
The alternative ground for precluding copyright in this case
was that input formats were not copyrightable per se. The court
stated, "[i]f the court is wrong in its finding that order and se-
quence are expressed ideas, not expressions, its alternative holding
is that formats are not copyrightable."' 6
If this case had arisen under the new Copyright Act (1976),
the outcome would probably have been the same. The definitions
in the Act are expansive, ' 7 and could be interpreted to include
input formats. However, the idea/expression dichotomy referred to
in the Synercom case is now codified,5 8 and it is likely that
Synercom's case would fail on this ground.
2. Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group59
The incredible technological revolution since the introduction
of computers has created the need for new responses to new ques-
tions. The gap between the rate of technological change and the
rate at which the law is responding is alarming. 60 This case illus-
trates the unfortunate results of applying (or misapplying) old le-
gal doctrine to new situations never envisioned when the old doc-
trine was developed.
In this case, Data Cash hired a consultant to develop a pro-
gram for a computerized chess game ("Compuchess") which was
introduced on the market in 1977.161 The game contained a ROM
which was manufactured by General Instruments, at the direction
of Data Cash.'62
There was no copyright notice on the ROM, the game board,
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., the definition of "literary works," discussed at note 119, supra.
158. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Supp. III 1979). See discussion at note 120, supra.
159. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Il1. 1979), aff'd on other grounds 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir.
1980).
160. In the near future, a computer may bear very little resemblance to the minicom-
puters now being used in homes and businesses. I.B.M. is developing a "Josephson Junction
Computer" which is housed in a 2" x 2" x 2" cube, contains about 8000 times more memory
than a typical small home computer, operates at 4 degrees Kelvin (about -450 degrees Fahr-
enheit), and operates about 1000 times faster than any present computer. See Oxman, supra
note 2, at 454 n.285.




the packaging, or the instructions.6 3 The only versions of the pro-
gram containing a copyright notice were the printed copies of the
source program 64 generated by Data Cash and the hired consult-
ant as internal documents. 65 The source program was registered
with the Copyright Office in November 1978.16
In 1978, Data Cash learned that General Instruments was
manufacturing a ROM for another chess game being made by
Novag Industries of Hong Kong for JS&A Industries. 167 At the re-
quest of Data Cash, General Instruments tested the new ROM and
found that it was identical to the Data Cash ROM. 6 8 The parties
speculated that the Data Cash ROM had been removed from the
Compuchess game and decoded by Novag Industries, which then
either provided a printout to General Instruments or put the coded
program into a PROM, which was furnished to General
Instuments. e9
Data Cash brought an action for copyright infringement and
unfair competition (misappropriation of property for commercial
advantage). Data Cash moved for a preliminary injunction and
JS&A moved for summary judgment.
In the district court, Judge Flaum held that the ROM was not
a "copy" under the copyright law; reproduction of the ROM could
not be an infringement of copyright (an issue that neither side had
briefed nor argued).1 70 The judge reached this conclusion by rea-
soning that a "copy" had to be "in a form which others can see and
read," and based his reasoning on the 1908 White-Smith v. Apollo
case.1
71
In so deciding, the judge drew a distinction between source
programs, which he classified as "writings" and copyrightable, and
object programs, which he classified as "machine parts"1 72 and not
163. Id. at 1041.
164. See definitions, supra notes 129-30.
165. 480 F. Supp. at 1066.
166. Id.
167. 628 F.2d at 1040-41.
168. Id. at 1040.
169. Bigelow, Object Program Held Not Copyrightable: No Protection for ROMS?, 6
COMPUTER L. & TAX REP. 5 (Dec. 1979). See the discussion of methods of copying ROMS at
text accompanying notes 128-33, supra.
170. 628 F.2d at 1041.
171. 480 F. Supp. at 1068. See discussion of White-Smith at text accompanying note
113, supra.
172. Id. at 1065.
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copyrightable. 17 3 This distinction was based on the questionable
assumption that object programs "enter into the mechanical pro-
cess itself, cannot be read without the aid of special equipment and
cannot be understood by even the most highly trained
programmers.
' '17 4
The judge recognized the fine line of distinction he was draw-
ing between "writings" and "machine parts" and stated that "at
different times, then a given program is both 'source' and 'ob-
ject.' ,,175 Judge Flaum discussed the phases of a computer pro-
gram, from a flowchart to the object code,17 6 but failed to recognize
the transitions as a series of translations.177
JS&A was able to obtain an identical copy of Data Cash's pro-
gram from the object code, without having access to the source
code. The fact that JS&A was successful in copying Data Cash's
game from the object code alone indicates that there is less differ-
ence between source and object code than the court indicated.
The appellate court paid little attention to Judge Flaum's rea-
soning, giving it one sentence of consideration: "The parties had
neither briefed nor argued that issue and neither side on appeal
defends the District Court's position, so we do not consider it
173. Id. at 1069.
174. Id. at 1065. In agreement with Judge Flaum, Commissioner Hersey, in his dissent
to the CONTU Final Report, expressed the belief that all programs "eventually become an
essential part of the machinery that produces the results." CONTU Report, supra note 2, at
71.
For sources disagreeing with Hersey's statement, see A. RALSTON & C. MEEK, supra
note 1, at 818, 1304-05; Maggs, supra note 9, at 455; Ross, supra note 2, at 755 n.140 ("ma-
chine language, though different for each model of computer and tedious to use, is readily
available to the skilled programmer for writing ordinary programs").
CONTU took the position that "programs should no more be considered machine parts
than videotapes should be considered parts of projectors or phonorecords parts of sound
reproduction equipment." CONTU Report, supra note 2, at 52.
This debate should be considered in light of the patent system, in which a patent appli-
cant strenuously urges that firmware is just another hardware element of the whole ma-
chine. See discussion of the Bradley case at text accompanying note 34, supra.
175. 480 F. Supp. at 1065.
176. Id.
177. "It is as clear an infringement to translate a computer program from, for example,
FORTRAN to ALGOL, as it is to translate a novel or play from English to French. In each
case, the substance of the expression ... is the same between original and copy, with only
the external manifestation of the expression changing. Likewise, it would probably be a vio-
lation to take a detailed description of a particular problem solution, such as a flowchart or
step-by-step set of prose instructions, written in human language, and program such a
description in computer language." Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462




The appellate court held that there was no infringement be-
cause of the lack of copyright notice.7 9 Under the old copyright
law, publication without notice resulted in forfeiture of the
copyright.
80
Data Cash argued that the sale of the games in 1977 was a
"limited publication" which did not divest Data Cash of copy-
right."8' The argument was based on Data Cash's contention that it
did not know that the ROM could be copied directly. 82 The court
rejected this argument, stating that the extent of publication is not
a question of the publisher's intent.'8"
As a result of Data Cash's innocent mistake or ignorance,
copyright was forfeited, and a program which took eight months to
develop81  was left in the public domain. Under copyright law, ig-
norance is not bliss.
Because the appellate court decided the case on the notice re-
quirements, it impliedly held that the object program in ROM was
copyrightable. If the program had not been copyrightable, there
would have been no need to consider the notice question. However,
because the court did not directly address the issue of
copyrightability, the case gives no firm guidelines upon which
firmware developers may rely.
The case was remanded to the district court for a determina-
tion of the unfair competition claim. Because the appellate court
held indirectly that ROM is copyrightable, plaintiff's claim for
misappropriation by copying of a property right for commercial
advantage falls within the scope of section 301(a) of the Copyright
Act and is probably preempted.1
8 5
If this case had arisen under the Copyright Act of 1976, it is
likely that the result would have been different. Under the 1976
Act, the notice requirements are not as strict. 8 6 There is no ques-
tion that the new Act had abolished Judge Flaum's requirement
178. 628 F.2d at 1038-41.
179. Id. at 1043.
180. Id at 1042.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1043.
183. Id.
184. 480 F. Supp. at 1065-66.
185. See preemption discussion at note 13, supra.
186. See 17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (Supp. III 1979).
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that a copy be "in a form which others can see and read. '187 Also,
the definition of a computer program under the amendment188
does not distinguish between software and firmware, or between
source code and object code.
In CONTU's recommendations for new regulations, it was sug-
gested that "semiconductor chips in which programs are stored"
(ROM) should bear copyright notice.18 Also,
Those programs that can be read only with the aid of a machine
or device should contain notice in the medium of fixation so that
the contents of the program cannot be listed without reproducing
the notice. 190
As an example of such notice, Apple II, computers that contain
firmware, display a copyright notice on the video display screen
every time the power is turned on.
IV. COPYRIGHT APPLICABILITY: WEST
GERMANY AND JAPAN
In evaluating the effectiveness of United States copyright pro-
tection for software and firmware, it is helpful to view the United
States system in light of the solutions offered by other countries.
Additionally, under international copyright conventions (discussed
in section V), a United States citizen may receive copyright protec-
tion under the domestic laws of a foreign country.
A. West Germany
The German Copyright Law9" protects "literary, scientific and
artistic works" which are personal intellectual creations.1 9 2 The law
does not define literary, scientific or artistic works, but lists exam-
ples of works eligible for protection, including writings, 93 works of
applied art and plans and sketches of such works,9 works pro-
187. See text accompanying note 127, supra.
188. See note 124, supra.
189. CONTU Report, supra note 2, at 34.
190. Id. at 33-34.
191. An Act Dealing with Copyright and Related Rights (Copyright Law) (Urheber-
rechtsgesetz) of Sept. 9, 1965, BGB1 I, 1273, No. 51 of Sept. 16, 1965; English translation in
1 UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS & TREATIES OF THE WORLD [hereinafter cited as CLTW], Ger-
man Federal Republic: Item 1.
192. Art. 2(1)-(2), 1 CLTW, supra note 191, at German Federal Republic: Item 1, at 1.
193. Id. art. 2(1)1.
194. Id. art. 2(1)4.
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duced by processes analogous to photography, 9 5 and illustrations
of a scientific or technical nature such as drawings, plans, maps,
sketches, tables, and plastic representations.196
The exclusive rights granted to an author are divided into per-
sonal rights (Urheberpersbnlichkeitsrechte) and rights of exploita-
tion (Verwertungrechte).197 Personal (or moral) rights include the
right of dissemination (right to make public), the right of recogni-
tion of authorship, and the right against distortion of the work.198
Rights of exploitation include general rights to exploit the
work in material form and specific rights to communicate the work
in non-material form.199 The rights of material exploitation consist
of the rights of reprodution (article 16), distribution (article 17),
and of exhibition (article 18).
The right of reproduction in article 16 is broadly defined, and
includes the right to make copies of the work "irrespective of
method or number. ' 20 0 There is no general definition of "copy" in
the Copyright Law, nor any requirement of visual perceptibility.
The exclusive right of reproduction is limited by provisions
which allow the owner of a copy of a protected work to make iso-
lated copies for personal and other internal uses.20 1 Copies made
under these provisions may not be distributed or sold.20 2 If the re-
production is made for an allowable internal use, and the copying
serves the commercial purposes of the copier, the copier must pay
the author an equitable compensation.203
Copyright protection arises upon creation of the work, and
there are no mandatory procedures to comply with as a prerequi-
site to protection.204 Protection expires seventy years after the au-
195. Id. art. 2(1)5.
196. Id. art. 2(1)7.
197. Id. art. 11, Item 1, at 2. See also A. BOGSCH, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT UNDER THE
UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION 339-40 (3d ed. 1970).
198. Arts. 12-14, 1 CLTW, supra note 191, at German Federal Republic: Item 1, at 2.
199. Id. art. 15, Item 1, at 2-3.
200. Id. art. 16(1), Item 1, at 3.
201. Id. arts. 53-54, Item 1, at 9-10. These provisions are similar to the United States
doctrine of fair use, set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 108 (Supp. III 1979).
202. Arts. 53(3), 54(3), 1 CLTW, supra note 191, at German Federal Republic: Item 1,
at 9-10.
203. Id. art. 54(2), Item 1, at 10.
204. A. BOGSCH, supra note 197, at 330. For the purposes of documentary proof of
copyright, the name of the author may be recorded in a copyright register which is kept at
the Patent Office. Art. 138, 1 CLTW, supra note 191 at German Federal Republic: Item 1, at
25.
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thor's death in most cases."s 5
It is the opinion of an advisory group of non-governmental ex-
perts that the Copyright Law will protect a computer program, if
the program constitutes an individual and original expression of
the author.20 6 Because there is no requirement that "copies" be
visible, the group concluded that a reproduction under the Copy-
right Law definition would occur if a program were copied during
its execution within a computer.20 7
Firmware may be protected under the Germany Copyright
Law in two ways. First, a program stored in ROM may be consid-
ered a "literary work. '20 8 With no requirement that copies be visu-
ally perceptible, the type of problem encountered in the Data Cash
case 20 9 would not arise. Second, the pattern on an integrated cir-
cuit, including data stored in ROM, may be considered a work
"produced by processes analogous to photography. '210 There is no
exclusion of utilitarian designs in the German Copyright Act.
B. Japan
The Japanese Copyright Law2 "' protects literary, scientific, ar-
tistic, and musical works in which "thoughts or sentiments are ex-
pressed in a creative way. "212 The definition of protectible "works"
includes: books and articles; 213 figurative works of a scientific na-
ture such as plans, charts and models;2 4 photographic works; 15
205. Art. 64(1), 1 CLTW, supra note 191, at German Federal Republic: Item 1, at 12.
206. Report of the Advisory Group of Nongovernmental Experts on the Protection of
Computer Programs, at a meeting of the World Intellectual Property Organization held in
Geneva, June 17 to June 20, 1974, at 1221 [hereinafter cited as Advisory Group Report],
reprinted in 6 COMPUTER L. SERVICE REP. (BIGELOW) 1218-27. Page numbers cited are from
6 COMPUTER L. SERVICE REP.
207. Id. CONTU concluded that under United States law, inputting a program into a
computer memory was the preparation of a copy. CONTU Report, supra note 2, at 55. The
German right of reproduction includes reproduction by any method (see text accompanying
note 200, supra), which encompasses reproduction by inputting a program into stored com-
puter memory.
208. The program must be an individual and original expression of an author. See text
accompanying note 206, supra.
209. See text accompanying notes 159-85, supra.
210. See text accompanying note 195, supra.
211. Law No. 48 of 1970 (May 6, 1970), Effective January 1971, reprinted in English in
1 CLTW, supra note 191, at Japan: Item 1.
212. Id. art. 2(1)(I), Item 1, at 1.
213. Id. art. 10(1)(I), Item 1, at 4.
214. Id. art. 10(1)(VI).
215. Id. art. 10(1)(VIII).
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and works produced by a process analogous to photography.216
The exclusive rights granted an author under the Japanese
Copyright Law include moral rights and "rights comprised in copy-
right." Moral rights consist of the right to make the work public,
the right of recognition of authorship, and the right of preserving
the integrity of the work.2 17 "Rights comprised in copyright" in-
clude, among others, the rights of reproduction (article 21), of pub-
lic performance (article 22), and of broadcasting (article 23).218
"Reproduction" under the Copyright Law means reproduction in a
tangible form.219 There is no requirement of visual perceptibility in
the definitions of protected work, copy, or reproduction.
The right of reproduction is limited by a fair use doctrine.
It shall be permissible for a user to reproduce by himself a work
forming the subject matter of a copyright ... for the purpose of
his personal use, family use or other similar uses within a limited
circle. 2
20
Protection under the Copyright Law arises upon creation of
the work,22' and continues for fifty years after the death of the
author.222 There are no mandatory procedures prerequisite to
protection,223 but there is an optional registration system for offi-
cial confirmation of dates of publication and transfers or
assignments.224
In May 1972, an interim report of the Software Legal Protec-
tion Investigation Committee was presented to the Ministry of In-
ternational Trade and Industry.225 The Committee concluded that
computer programs could be considered to be "literary works"
within the scope of the Copyright Law.
226
Under Japanese law, as under German law, firmware may be
protected either as a literary work or as a work produced by a- pro-
216. Id. art. 2(4), Item 1, at 3.
217. Id. arts. 17-20, Item 1, at 5-6.
218. Id. Item 1, at 6.
219. Id. art. 2(1) (XV), Item 1, at 2.
220. Id. art. 30, Item 1, at 7.
221. Id. art. 51(1), Item 1, at 11.
222. Id. art. 51(2).
223. Id. art. 17(2), Item 1, at 5.
224. Id. arts. 75-78, Item 1, at 16-17.
225. Interim Report of the Software Legal Protection Investigation Committee of the
Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry [hereinafter referred to as MITI
Report], reprinted in 6 COMPUTER L. SERVICE REP. (BIGELOW), sec. 9-4, art. 3 (1973). Pages
cited refer to pages in 6 CoMPuTER L. SERVICE REP., sec. 9-4, art. 3.
226. Id. at 3.
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cess analogous to photography.2 7 The Japanese law does not ex-
clude utilitarian designs from copyright protection.
In its 1972 report, the Software Legal Protection Investigation
Committee concluded that copyright protection under the existing
Copyright Law was not appropriate for computer programs for
three reasons:
(1) the Copyright Law cannot be extended to protect against the
execution of programs;
(2) duplicated investments would occur because there is no
mandatory publication system; and
(3) the term of protection is too long.
2 28
The Committee's recommendations will be discussed in section VI.
V. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
A. Universal Copyright Convention
22
The United States, West Germany, and Japan, among others,
are members of this Convention.23 0 An important feature of this
agreement is that it provides for "national treatment" for citizens
of the member countries.2 31 That is, if computer programs are
given copyright protection in the United States, then programs
published in other member countries will be protected in the
United States, whether or not the other member country recog-
nizes such protection under its domestic law.
The Convention has limitations, however, which may reduce
its usefulness in protecting software and firmware. "Publication"
227. See discussion at text accompanying notes 208-10, supra.
228. MITI Report, supra note 225, at 3.
229. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324,
revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868.
230. For a list of member countries, see Abelman & Berkovitz, International Copyright
Law, 22 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 619, 647-51 (1977).
231. Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 229, art. II(1):
Published works of nationals of any Contracting State and works first published
in that State shall enjoy in each other Contracting State the same protection as
that other State accords to works of its nationals first published in its own terri-
tory, as well as the protection specially granted by this Convention.
25 U.S.T. 1345.
Art. 11(2): Unpublished works of nationals of each Contracting State shall enjoy in
each other Contracting State the same protection as that other State accords to





may determine whether protection is afforded. The Convention de-
fines publication as "the reproduction in tangible form and the
general distribution to the public of copies of a work from which it
can be read or otherwise visually perceived. 2 32 If an author of a
work is a national of a member country of the Convention, the
work is eligible for protection in all other member states, regard-
less of whether published or not, and irrespective of the place of
first publication.23 3 If the author is not a national of a member
country, then the Convention applies only if the work is first pub-
lished in a member country.
2 4
If a work is not in a form from which it can be visually per-
ceived, thus not "published" under the Convention, widespread
dissemination of the work may cause the work to be in the public
domain. This result will depend on the laws of the country in
which the work is distributed.235
The requirement of visual perceptibility would seem to ex-
clude works distributed in the form of magnetic tape, punched
cards, magnetic disks, or firmware. Until the visual perception lim-
itation is changed, or until it is interpreted not to preclude publi-
cation of machine-readable copies, the Universal Copyright Con-
vention will be of somewhat limited use for protection of software
and firmware.
B. Berne Union236
West Germany and Japan, among others, are members of the
Berne Union, but the United States is not.37 Like the Universal
Copyright Convention, the Berne Convention provides for national
232. Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 229, art. VI, at 1362.
233. A. BOGSCH, supra note 197, at 79.
234. Id.
235. For example, neither Japan nor Germany requires that a work be in a visually
perceptible form in order to be "published." See text accompanying notes 201 and 221,
supra. Works distributed in these countries by nationals of a convention country would be
"published" according to domestic law.
236. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Sept. 9, 1886)
3, [hereinafter cited as Berne Convention], as amended by the Paris Additional Act and
Interpretative Declaration (1896), the Berlin Convention (1908), the Berne Additional Pro-
tocol (1914), the Rome Convention (1928), the Brussels Convention (1948), and the Paris
Convention (1971), 331 U.N.T.S. 217 No. 4757 (1948 text). For the texts from 1886 to 1971,
see generally CLTW, supra note 191.
237. For a list of member countries, see Abelman & Berkovitz, supra note 230, at 647-
No. 31
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
treatment.2 38
The prerequisite for obtaining protection under this agree-
ment is first publication (or publication within thirty days of first
publication elsewhere) in a member nation.23 9 The author need not
be a national of a member country to enjoy protection under the
Convention.240 Works are "published" when copies have been is-
sued and made available in sufficient quantities to the public,
whatever the means of manufacture of the copies.241
The Berne Convention applies to "every production in the lit-
erary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or
form of its expression. '242 Examples of types of works protected
include books and other writings; photographic works and works
produced by a process analogous to photography; works of applied
art; and plans and sketches relative to architecture or science.243
However, protection for works of applied art and industrial designs
may be limited by legislation in the various member countries.244
Because there is no requirement of visually perceptible copies
in this agreement, software and firmware will be within the scope
of protection. However, under both the Universal Copyright Con-
vention and the Berne Union, the scope of protection is deter-
mined by the domestic law in each country. Therefore, there will
not be uniform international protection as long as national laws
vary.
In case a dispute arises between countries that are members of
both the Berne Union and the Universal Copyright Convention,
the Berne Union governs. The Universal Copyright Convention
states that it "shall not be applicable to the relationships among
countries of the Berne Union in so far as it relates to the protec-
tion of works having as their country of origin [a Berne
country]. ''245
The Berne Union does not allow any formalities of notice or
registration as a prerequisite of copyright protection.24 6 This provi-
238. Berne Convention, supra note 236, art. 4(1).
239. See id. arts. 5, 6(1) and 4(3), at 225.
240. Id. art. 6(1).
241. Id. art. 4(4).
242. Id. art. 2(1), at 221.
243. Id.
244. Id. art. 2(5), at 223.
245. Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 229, appendix declaration relating to
art. XVII(c), 25 U.S.T. at 1370.
246. See Berne Convention, supra note 236, art. 4(2), at 223. In contrast, the Universal
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sion has barred the United States from joining the Union under
the existing United States Copyright Law.247
VI. OTHER PROPOSALS
Two proposals have been put forward to establish a registra-
tion and deposit system, similar to the United States Copyright
system, but adapted from the special problems of computer pro-
grams. Under both the I.B.M. proposal 248 and the MITI propo-
sal,2 " the proprietor of a program would be required to submit
some description of the program in order to obtain protection.
The I.B.M. proposal would require a conceptual description of
the program, detailed enough that "a skilled programmer could
take the descriptive material and write a program utilizing the con-





The MITI proposal would require the deposit of an outline of
the program.251 Under both proposals, the registrar of the program
would make public the description or outline.252
The I.B.M. proposal would also require the deposit of a copy
of the program in source or object code, which the registrar would
keep secret for the term of the protection.253 If the proprietor of
the program wished to obtain protection for detailed descriptive
254 imaterial accompanying the program, then it could also be regis-
tered and deposited.255 At the end of the term of protection, both
Copyright Convention allows member states to require formalities as a condition to copy-
right protection. Supra note 229, art 111(2), 25 U.S.T. 1346.
247. The most obvious barrier is the United States requirement of copyright notice.
1980 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 139, at 918.
248. Galbi, Proposal for New Legislation to Protect Computer Programming, 17 BULL.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 280, 284 (1970), summarizing the proposal submitted to the Patent Office
by I.B.M. in 1968.
249. MITI Report, supra note 225, at 5.
250. Galbi, supra note 248, at 291. This is similar to the disclosure required in a patent
application in the United States.
251. MITI Report, supra note 225, at 5.
252. Galbi, supra note 248, at 284; MITI Report, supra note 225, at 6.
253. Galbi, supra note 248, at 284, 289.
254. Defined as "material which would make it reasonably possible for one skilled in
the art to write essentially the same sequence of instructions as the sequence of instructions
in the program which the descriptive material describes." Id. at 291. This descriptive mate-
rial would allow the "expressions" in the program to be reproduced, while the conceptual
description of the program, required to be disclosed, would only allow the result to be
duplicated.
255. Id. at 285.
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the program and any detailed descriptive material would be made
public."'
Under the I.B.M. proposal, the term of protection would be
relatively short, such as five or ten years. 57 This proposal also di-
rectly addresses firmware, stating that programs stored in memory,
including ROM, would be protected.25
Under both proposals, infringement would consist of any un-
authorized duplication of a registered program, execution of a reg-
istered program, use of a registered program in the preparation of
a new program, or any unauthorized transfer of possession of a reg-
istered program."'
The MITI proposal adds extra "teeth" to the registration sys-
tem. Under this proposal, the burden of proof would shift upon
registration.26 0 The alleged infringer would have to prove that the
allegedly infringing' program was not created by an act of
infringement.261
A third proposal has been advanced by the International Bu-
reau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (the "WIPO
proposal"). 2  This proposal embodies a copyright approach (pro-
tection of the expression, not the underlying ideas), with no re-
quirement of disclosure or registration.263
The WIPO proposal would protect the program, whether in
machine or human readable form, as well as the program descrip-
tion, flowcharts, and supporting material. 26 The protection would
arise upon creation of the software, with no procedural
requirements.6 5
Protection would only extend to original works,26 and would
not extend to the concepts on which the software was based.6 7 In-
dependent creation of a similar program would not be an infring-
ing act.26s The term of protection would be twenty-five years from
256. Id. at 284.
257. Id. at 288.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 287; MITI Report, supra note 225, at 6.
260. MITI Report, supra note 225, at 6.
261. Id.
262. WIPO Report, supra note 6.
263. Id. at 7.
264. Id. at 11-14.
265. Id. at 21.
266. Id. at 16.
267. Id. at 17.
268. Id. at 20.
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the creation of the software, or twenty years from the date of first
authorized commercial use, whichever term ends first.26 9 This pro-
posal specifically provides for protection of "items of computer
hardware with software stored in them.1
270
Registration and disclosure systems have been criticized as be-
ing cumbersome and expensive. 7 1 Disclosure systems have also
been criticized for not protecting the underlying idea by those who
prefer the present patent approach. Systems not requiring disclo-
sure, such as the WIPO proposal, have been criticized as promot-
ing inefficiency, and not promoting the general welfare, by those
who prefer the disclosure mechanisms of the present patent
systems. 2
VII. CONCLUSION
Various types of proprietary protection are available to stimu-
late investment in the development of computer software and
firmware, including unfair competition laws, product design, pat-
ents, petty patents, trade secrets, copyrights, and other registration
systems; however, copyright offers the most appropriate form of
protection for computer software and firmware.,
In the United States, West Germany, and Japan, copyright
protection exists upon creation of the work. Few or no formalities
are required to maintain copyright protection for the term of the
copyright. The registration procedure is either optional or is quick
and inexpensive. Copyright laws protect the expression of the idea,
which is the most costly element in the development of software
and firmware.
Although current copyright laws in the United States, West
Germany, and Japan protect some computer software and
firmware, the laws do not extend to much of the existing and
emerging technology. Attempts to conform copyright laws to pre-
sent technology have been largely unsuccessful and presently the
law is two or three decades behind technological processes. With
the exponential growth of technology, and the sluggish rate of
change of the law in response, the gap between the protection
needed and that granted is widening.
269. Id. at 21.
270. Id. at 20.
271. See, e.g., 3 COMPUTER L. SERVICE (BIGELOW) sec. 4-1, art. 6, at 19 (1980).
272. Id. See also the MITI Report criticism, at text accompanying note 228, supra.
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Without a conscientious effort on the part of the legislature,
judiciary, and bar to keep abreast with the emerging technology,
we risk becoming an innovative backwater in the near future and
soon our laws will be as appropriate as screen doors on a
submarine.*
* Since this article was prepared for publication, the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of California held, in Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., No. 81-
0744 (N. D. Cal., Aug. 31, 1981), that a program imprinted in ROM may be protected by
copyright. The court held that a silicon chip is a "tangible medium of expression" within the
meaning of section 102 of the Copyright Act.
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